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ABSTRACT
Machine learning models trained on confidential datasets are increasingly being deployed for profit.
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has made such models easily accessible to end-users. Prior
work has developed model extraction attacks, in which an adversary extracts an approximation of
MLaaS models by making black-box queries to it. However, none of these works is able to satisfy
all the three essential criteria for practical model extraction: (i) the ability to work on deep learning
models, (ii) the non-requirement of domain knowledge and (iii) the ability to work with a limited
query budget. We design a model extraction framework that makes use of active learning and large
public datasets to satisfy them. We demonstrate that it is possible to use this framework to steal deep
classifiers trained on a variety of datasets from image and text domains. By querying a model via
black-box access for its top prediction, our framework improves performance on an average over a
uniform noise baseline by 4.70× for image tasks and 2.11× for text tasks respectively, while using
only 30% (30,000 samples) of the public dataset at its disposal.
Keywords model extraction · active learning · machine learning · deep neural networks · black-box attacks
1 Introduction
Due to their success in recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly being deployed in production
software. The security of these models is thus of paramount importance. The most common attacks against DNNs focus
on the generation of adversarial examples [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], where attackers add an imperceptible perturbation to
inputs (typically images) that cause DNNs to misclassify them.
In this paper, we turn our attention to privacy vulnerabilities. Today, Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) providers
like Google, Amazon and Azure make ML models available through APIs to developers of web and mobile applications.
These services are monetized by billing queries pro rata. The business model of these services rests on the privacy of
the model. If it was possible for a potential competitor or end user to create a copy of these models with access only to
the query API, it would pose a great threat to their business.
By extracting a copy of a ML model, not only would an adversary have the ability to make unlimited free queries to it,
they would also be able to implement applications requiring gradient information, such as crafting adversarial examples
that fool the secret MLaaS model [7], performing model inversion [9] (discovering the training data on which the model
was originally trained) and exploring the explainability of proprietary ML models (e.g., by training an explainable
substitute model such as a decision tree classifier [10]).
∗All three authors contributed equally.
†All three authors contributed equally.
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Figure 1: Overview of model extraction
Model privacy is also important to developers of other ML products (such as self-driving vehicles and translation tools).
Datasets are expensive to gather and curate, and models require expertise to design and implement – thus, it is in the
best interest of corporations to protect their ML models to maintain a competitive edge.
Tramèr et al. [11] define the concept of model extraction (see Figure 1). In model extraction, the adversary is an agent
that can query a secret model (e.g., a MLaaS provider via APIs) to obtain predictions on any supplied input vector
of its choosing. The returned predictions may either be label probability distributions, or just the Top-1 prediction
– we assume the latter. Using the obtained predictions, the adversary trains a substitute model to approximate the
secret model function. The adversary may not know the secret model architecture or associated hyperparameters. The
adversary has access to a thief dataset of the same media type (i.e. images or text) from which it draws samples to
query the secret model. The data in this thief dataset may be drawn from a different distribution than the secret dataset
on which the secret model was originally trained. Prior work has used the following thief datasets:
• Uniform noise: Tramèr et al. [11] perform model extraction by querying the secret model with inputs sampled
i.i.d. uniformly at random. They demonstrate their method on logistic regression models, SVMs, shallow (1
hidden layer) feedforward neural networks and decision trees. According to our experiments, this approach
does not scale well to deeper neural networks (such as our architecture for image classification with 12
convolutional layers; see Section 6.1 for further details).
• Hand-crafted examples: Papernot et al. [7] design a model extraction framework that can be used to extract
DNNs. However, this technique assumes domain knowledge on the part of the attacker. The adversary should
either have access to a subset of the secret dataset, or create data (such as by drawing digits using a pen tablet)
that closely resembles it.
• Unlabeled non-problem domain data: Correia-Silva et al. [12] demonstrate that convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) can be copied by querying them with a mix of non-problem domain and problem domain data. For
example, they demonstrate that a DNN trained using European crosswalk images [13] as the secret dataset can
be copied using a mix of ImageNet (non-problem domain data) and crosswalk images from America and Asia
(problem domain data) as the thief dataset. They do not consider a query budget in their work.
In this work, we investigate the feasibility of implementing a practical approach to model extraction, viz. one that deals
with the following criteria:
• Ability to extract DNNs: Most state of the art ML solutions use DNNs. Thus, it is critical for a model
extraction technique to be effective for this class of models.
• No domain knowledge: The adversary should be expected to have little to no domain knowledge related to
task implemented by the secret model. In particular, they should not be expected to have access to samples
from the secret dataset.
• Ability to work within a query budget: Queries made to MLaaS services are billed pro rata, and such
services are often rate limited. Thus, it is in an attacker’s best interest to minimize the number of queries they
make to the secret model.
We compare our approach to the three approaches described above on these three criteria [11, 7, 12] in Table 1. As can
be seen, we can extract DNNs with no domain knowledge, while working with a limited query budget. To achieve these
criteria, our paper introduces two novel techniques:
2
A framework for the extraction of Deep Neural Networks by leveraging public data A PREPRINT
Table 1: Comparison of Model Extraction approaches
Model extraction Works on No domain Limited #
technique DNNs knowledge of queries
Tramèr et al. [11] 7 3 3
Papernot et al. [7] 3 7 3
Copycat CNN [12] 3 3 7
Our framework 3 3 3
• Universal thief datasets: These are large and diverse public domain datasets, analogous to the non-problem
domain (NPD) data of Correia-Silva et al. [12]. For instance, we show that ImageNet constitutes a universal
thief for vision tasks, whereas a dataset of Wikipedia articles constitutes a universal thief for NLP tasks. Our
key insight is that universal thief datasets provide a more natural prior than uniform noise, while not requiring
domain knowledge to obtain.
• Active learning strategies: Active learning is a technique used in scenarios where labeling is expensive. It
strives to select a small yet informative set of training samples to maximize accuracy while minimizing the
total labeling cost. In this paper, we use pool-based active learning, where the algorithm has access to a large
set of unlabeled examples (i.e. the thief dataset) from which it picks the next sample(s) to be labeled.
Although universal thief datasets constitute an excellent prior for model extraction, their size makes them
unsuitable for use when the query budget is limited. We make use of active learning to construct an optimal
query set, thus reducing the number of queries made to the MLaaS model. This ensures that the attacker stays
within the query budget.
Our contributions include:
1. We define the notion of universal thief datasets for different media types such as images and text.
2. We propose a framework for model extraction that makes use of universal thief datasets in conjunction with
active learning strategies. We demonstrate our framework on DNNs for image and text classification tasks.
3. Finally, we introduce the notion of ensemble active learning strategies as a combination of existing active
learning strategies. We design and leverage one such ensemble strategy to improve performance.
Overall, we demonstrate that by leveraging public data and active learning, we improve agreement between the secret
model and the substitute model by, on an average, 4.70× (across image classification tasks) and 2.11× (across text
classification tasks) over the uniform noise baseline of Tramèr et al. [11], when working with a total query budget of
30K.
We plan to release the source code for our framework under an open source license soon.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce the active learning set of techniques from the machine learning literature. We also briefly
discuss adversarial example generation, which is later used as the crux of the DeepFool Active Learning (DFAL)
strategy [14] used by our framework.
2.1 Preliminaries
In machine learning, a dataset D consists of labeled examples (x, y), where x ∈ X is an example and y ∈ Y is its
associated label, where X is said to be the instance space and Y is the label space. It is assumed that there is an
underlying unknown mapping φ : X → Y from which D is generated (i.e. (x, y) ∈ D implies that y = φ(x)). In this
paper, we restrict ourselves to the classification setting, where Y = {e1, e2, . . . , eJ}3.
3ej represents the j th standard basis vector, i.e. 〈0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 0〉 ∈ RJ , a vector with a a 1 in the j th position, and 0
elsewhere. Such a vector is said to be one-hot. A pair (x, y) where y is a vector with 1 in the j th position indicates that the sample x
belongs to the j th class (out of J classes).
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In passive machine learning, the learner has access to a large training dataset Dtrain of labeled examples and must learn
a hypothesis function f that minimizes a loss function. A typical loss function is mean squared error (MSE):
LMSE(f,Dtrain) = 1|Dtrain|
∑
(x,y)∈Dtrain
‖y − f(x)‖22
The better the hypothesis (i.e. when predictions f(x) match labels y), the lower the value of the loss function L. Other
loss functions such as cross-entropy (CE) are also used. Machine learning models such as DNNs learn a function by
minimizing this loss function on the training dataset. DNNs, when trained on a large corpus of training examples, have
been shown to exhibit good generalization ability across a diversity of tasks in various domains [15], i.e. provided a
previously unseen test example xtest, the prediction that they make, f(xtest) approximates the value of φ(xtest) well, i.e.
f(xtest) ≈ φ(xtest).
However, to achieve good generalization performance, such DNNs require a very large training dataset. The labeling
effort required is massive, and learning may be intractable in scenarios where there is a high cost associated with each
label, such as paying crowd workers. In the context of model extraction, this may involve querying a MLaaS model,
which are billed pro rata by the MLaaS service provider.
2.2 Active learning
Active learning [16] is useful in scenarios where there is a high cost associated with labeling instances. In active
learning, the learner does not use the full labeled dataset D. Rather, the learner starts with either an unlabeled dataset X
of samples x; or, alternatively, the learner can itself generate samples x de novo. Following this, an oracle fO is used to
label the sample, which assigns it the true label y = fO(x). Active learning can be broadly classified into one of the
following scenarios:
• Stream-based selective sampling: In this scenario, the learner is presented with a stream of unlabeled samples
x1, x2, x3, . . . , drawn from the underlying distribution. The learner must decide to either accept or reject an
individual sample xn for querying. This can be done by checking, e.g., the “uncertainty” of the prediction (we
will formally define this in Section 4.1) made by the classifier on a specific sample xn. For samples that are
accepted by the learner, the oracle is queried to label them. Once rejected, a sample cannot be queried in the
future.
• Pool-based sampling: In this scenario, the learner has access to a full unlabeled dataset X of samples
{x1, x2, . . . x|X|}. Unlike in stream-based selective sampling, the learner does not have to consider each
sample xn in isolation. The learner’s objective is thus to select a subset S ⊆ X of samples to be queried.
While it is possible to do this in one shot, pool-based sampling may also be done incrementally, either choosing
one sample at a time, or an entire batch of samples in each iteration. Correspondingly, the oracle may be
queried on one sample at a time, or the entire batch of selected samples.
• Query synthesis: Here, the learner generates samples x de novo without first approximating the underlying
distribution. This process could be entirely uninformed – for instance, the learner could generate data points
by sampling uniformly at random from a multivariate uniform or Gaussian distribution – or, it could be more
informed: such as by using a generative model. The oracle is then queried with the generated sample.
In this work, we make use of pool-based sampling. In particular, we consider the scenario where the learner adds a
batch of samples in each iteration of the algorithm. We grow the subset S0 ( S1 ( S2 ( · · · ( SN over N iterations,
such that each subset Si is a selection of samples from the full dataset Si ⊆ X .
2.3 Adversarial example generation and the DeepFool technique
We introduce the notion of adversarial example generation, in particular the DeepFool [6] technique. This technique
will be used while introducing the DeepFool Active Learning (DFAL) [14] active learning strategy in Section 4.1.
It is known that DNNs can be easily fooled as demonstrated by, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) of Goodfellow
et al. [1], the C&W attack of Carlini and Wagner [3], the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) of Papernot et al.
[5] and many others [2, 4, 6, 7, 8]. In particular, neural networks trained to perform image classification tasks have been
shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversary can add a small amount of noise to input images, which,
while being imperceptible to the human eye, can change the classification decision made by the neural network, as
shown in Figure 2.
These techniques typically work as follows – given an innocuous image x, they compute a small, typically imperceptible
additive noise δ. This noise is then added to the original image to produce an adversarial image, xˆ = x + δ. The
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f(x) = MNIST Digit 2
97.09% Confidence
+
Adversarial Noise δ
(Generated by DeepFool)
=
f(xˆ) = MNIST Digit 8
60.95% Confidence
Figure 2: Adversarial example generation using DeepFool [6].
objective is that, given a machine learning model f , the prediction of the perturbed image no longer matches the
prediction made for the original image, viz. f(x) 6= f(xˆ).
DeepFool [6] is one such technique for the generation of adversarial examples. It solves the following problem
iteratively:
δ∗ = argmin
δ
‖δ‖2 s.t. f(x+ δ) 6= f(x)
In the binary classification setting (i.e. where range f = {−1, 1}), it uses a first order approximation of the analytical
solution for the linearly-separable case:
δl = − f(xl)‖∇f(xl)‖22
∇f(xl)
xl+1 = xl + δl
The process is started by setting x0 = x, and terminates at the lowest index L for which f(xL) 6= f(x). The total
perturbation is obtained by taking the sum of the individual perturbations at each step, δ =
∑L
l=1 δl. This algorithm can
be extended to work in the multiclass classification setting. We refer interested readers to [8] for further details.
3 Threat model
Before we describe the proposed algorithm, we first state the threat model under which it operates.
Attack surface. We assume that the adversary cannot directly access the secret model, but can only query it in a
black-box fashion via an API. We assume that there is a query cost associated with each API query made by the
adversary. While there is no limit on the number of queries that can be made theoretically, the ability of the adversary to
make queries is restricted in practice by the total query budget. This query cost model can be used to model rate-limiting
defenses. For example, each query can have an associated cost, and a defense would be to limit queries from a source
that has exceeded its cost threshold.
Capabilities. The adversary has black-box access to the secret model via an API, by which it can query it with any
image or text of its choosing. It thus has full knowledge of both the input specification (i.e. the type of media – images
or text) and the output specification (the set of possible labels). Note that the adversary does not have direct access to the
exact gradient information of the model, but only the final prediction. We consider two scenarios – one where a Top-1
prediction is returned (as a one-hot standard basis vector), and another where the model returns a softmax4 probability
distribution over the target output classes. Our primary experiments assume the weaker capability of receiving only the
Top-1 predictions, and not the softmax probability distributions.5
Information of the secret model architecture and model hyperparameters need not be known to the adversary, as we
show in Section 6.2. However, as peak performance is achieved when the adversary is aware of the architecture of the
secret model, and since it is possible to detect these hyperparameters and architectural choices by a related line of work
(model reverse-engineering [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]), we report our main results using the same architecture for both the
secret and substitute models.
Further, the adversary has no knowledge of the secret dataset D on which the model was originally trained. It can
however make use of unlabeled public data, i.e. the thief dataset Xthief. Note that this data needs to be labeled first by
the secret model before it can be used to train the substitute model.
4Given unnormalized scores a1, a2, . . . aJ over J classes, the softmax function computes the normalized quantities pi =
exp(ai)/
∑J
j=1 exp(aj). The resulting pi values constitute a valid probability distribution.
5However, in Table 4 we also consider the situation where the softmax probability distribution is available to the adversary.
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Figure 3: Our framework for model extraction (see Section 4 for explanation of steps 1-5).
Adversary’s goal. The goal of the adversary is to obtain a substitute model function that closely resembles (i.e.
approximates) the secret model function:
f˜ ≈ f
To do so, it trains a substitute model f˜ on a subset of the thief dataset, S ⊆ Xthief,
f˜ ≈ argmin
f ′
L(f ′, {(x, f(x)) : x ∈ S})
where L is the chosen loss function. As there is a cost associated with querying f and |Xthief|, the adversary would want
|S|  |Xthief|. The resulting model f˜ is treated as the extracted model at the end of the process. As it is not possible
to arrive at analytical optimum in the general case, the quality of the extracted model is judged using the following
Agreement metric.
Definition (Agreement): Two models f and f˜ agree on the label for a sample x if they predict the same label for the
same sample, i.e. f(x) = f˜(x). The agreement of two networks f and f˜ is the fraction of samples x from a dataset D
on which they agree, i.e. for which f(x) = f˜(x)
Agreement(f, f˜ ,D) = 1|D|
∑
(x,y)∈D
1[f(x) = f˜(x)]
where 1(·) is the indicator function. Note that the agreement score does not depend on the true label y. Agreement is
penalized for every sample for which the predicted labels by the two models f(x) and f˜(x) do not match. The higher
the agreement between two models on a held-out test set, the more likely it is that the extracted model approximates the
secret model well.
4 Technical details
We start with a high-level description of the framework with reference to Figure 3.
1. The adversary first picks a random subset S0 of the unlabeled thief dataset Xthief to kickstart the process.
2. In the ith iteration (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N ), the adversary queries the samples in Si against the secret model f and
obtains the correctly labeled subset Di = {(x, f(x)) : x ∈ Si}.
3. Using Di, it trains the substitute model f˜ .
4. The trained substitute model is then queried with all samples in Xthief to form the approximately labeled
dataset D˜i+1.
5. A subset selection strategy uses D˜i+1 to select the points Si+1 to be queried next.
The process is repeated for a fixed number of iterations, with the substitute model f˜ being refined in each iteration. The
procedure is formally described in Algorithm 1. The training procedure followed by TRAINNETWORK is described in
Section 5.3. The details of SUBSETSELECTION follow.
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Algorithm 1: Model extraction by active learning
Input :secret model f ; unlabeled thief dataset Xthief
Parameters : iteration count N ; total query budget B;
seed size k0; validation fraction η
Output :Substitute model, f˜
1 Svalid ← ηB random datapoints from Xvalidthief ;
2 Dvalid ← {(x, f(x)) : x ∈ Svalid};
3 S0 ← k0 random datapoints from X trainthief ;
4 D0 ← {(x, f(x)) : x ∈ S0};
5 k ← ((1− η)B − k0)÷ n;
6 for i ∈ {1 . . . N} do
7 f˜ ← TRAINNETWORK(Di−1, Dvalid);
8 D˜i ← {(x, f˜(x)) : x ∈ X trainthief ∧ (x, ·) 6∈ Di−1};
9 Si ← SUBSETSELECTION(D˜i, Di−1, k);
10 Di ← Di−1 ∪ {(x, f(x)) : x ∈ Si};
11 end
12 f˜ ← TRAINNETWORK(DN , Dvalid);
4.1 Active learning subset selection strategies
In each iteration, the adversary selects a new set of k thief dataset samples Si ⊆ Xthief to label by querying the secret
model f . This is done using a strategy from the active learning literature:
• Random strategy: A subset of size k consisting of samples xn is selected uniformly at random, corresponding
to pairs (xn, y˜n) in D˜i.
• Uncertainty strategy: This method is based on uncertainty sampling [23]. For every pair (xn, y˜n) ∈ D˜i, the
entropyHn of predicted probability vectors y˜n = f˜(xn) is computed:
Hn = −
∑
j
y˜n,j log y˜n,j
where j is the label index. The k samples xn corresponding to the highest entropy valuesHn (i.e. those that
the model is least certain about) are selected, breaking ties arbitrarily.
Ducoffe and Precioso [14] demonstrate that the uncertainty strategy does not work well on DNNs. Thus, we also
consider two state-of-the-art active learning strategies for DNNs:
• K-center strategy: We use the greedy K-center algorithm of Sener and Savarese [24] to construct a core-set
of samples. This strategy operates in the space of probability vectors produced by the substitute model. The
predicted probability vectors y˜m = f˜(xm) for samples (xm, ym) ∈ Di−1 are considered to be cluster centers.
In each iteration, the strategy selects k centers by picking, one at a time, pairs (xn, y˜n) ∈ D˜i such that y˜n is
the most distant from all existing centers:
(x∗0, y˜
∗
0) = arg max
(xn,y˜n)∈D˜i
min
(xm,ym)∈Di−1
‖y˜n − y˜m‖22
(x∗1, y˜
∗
1) = arg max
(xn,y˜n)∈D˜1i
min
(xm,ym)∈D1i−1
‖y˜n − y˜m‖22
where:
D˜1i ←D˜i \ {(x∗0, y˜∗0)}
D1i−1 ←Di−1 ∪ {
(
x∗0, f(x
∗
0)
)}
i.e. (x∗0, y˜
∗
0) is moved to the set of selected centers. This process is repeated to obtain k pairs. The samples
x∗0, x
∗
1, . . . x
∗
k corresponding to the chosen pairs are selected.
• Adversarial strategy: We use the DeepFool Active Learning (DFAL) algorithm by Ducoffe and Precioso
[14]. In this strategy, DeepFool [6] (explained in Section 2.3) is applied to every sample xn ∈ D˜i to obtain a
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Table 2: Details of datasets for image and text classification tasks. # Train, # Val and # Test refer to the number of
samples in the train, validation and test folds respectively. Note that the thief datasets (ImageNet subset and WikiText-2)
do not have predefined folds, but the fractions used for training and validation have been tabulated for reference.
(a) Details of datasets for image classification tasks.
Image Dataset Dimensions # Train # Val # Test # Classes
MNIST 28× 28× 1 48K 12K 10K 10
F-MNIST 28× 28× 1 48K 12K 10K 10
CIFAR-10 32× 32× 3 40K 10K 10K 10
GTSRB 32× 32× 3 ∼ 31K ∼ 8K ∼ 12K 43
ImageNet subset 64× 64× 3 100K 50K – –
(b) Details of datasets for text classification tasks.
Text Dataset # Train # Val # Test # Classes
MR 7,676 1,920 1,066 2
IMDB 20K 5K 25K 2
AG News 96K 24K ∼ 7K 5
QC ∼ 12K 3K .5K 6
WikiText-2 ∼ 89K ∼ 10K – –
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Figure 4: Network architecture for image classification tasks
.
perturbed xˆn that gets misclassified by the substitute model f˜ , i.e. f˜(xn) 6= f˜(xˆn). (Note that this does not
involve querying the secret model.) Let:
αn = ‖xn − xˆn‖22
DFAL is a margin-based approach to active learning, i.e. it identifies samples that lie close to the decision
boundary. To do this, it prefers samples xn corresponding to lower values of αn, i.e. smallest distance between
xn and its adversarially perturbed neighbor xˆn that lies across the decision boundary. Thus, this strategy
selects the k samples xn corresponding to the lowest perturbation αn.
4.2 Ensemble of subset selection strategies
While the K-center strategy maximizes diversity, it does not ensure that each individual sample is helpful to the learner.
On the contrary, while the adversarial strategy ensures that each individual sample is informative, it does nothing to
eliminate redundancy across the samples selected. Inspired by this observation, we introduce the following ensemble
subset selection strategy called Adversarial+K-center strategy.
In this ensemble strategy, the adversarial strategy is first used to pick ρ points (ρ is a configurable parameter). Of these,
k points are selected using the K-center strategy.The adversarial strategy first picks samples that lie close to the decision
boundary. Following this, the K-center strategy selects a subset of these points with an aim to maximize diversity. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of this strategy experimentally in Section 6.1.
5 Experimental setup
We now describe the datasets and DNN architecture used in our experiments.
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5.1 Datasets
The details of each dataset can be found in Table 2.
Secret datasets. For image classification, we use the MNIST dataset of handwritten digits [25], the Fashion-MNIST
(F-MNIST) dataset of small grayscale images of fashion products across 10 categories [26], the CIFAR-10 dataset of
tiny color images [27] and the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) [28].
For text classification, we use the MR dataset [29] of 5,331 positive and 5,331 statements from movie reviews, the
IMDB [30] dataset of movie reviews, AG News corpus 6 of news from 5 categories and the QC question classification
dataset [31].
Thief dataset. For images, we use a subset of the ILSVRC2012-14 dataset [32] as the thief dataset. In particular,
we use a downsampled version of this data prepared by Chrabaszcz et al. [33]. The training and validation splits are
reduced to a subset of size 100,000, while the test split is left unchanged.
For text, we use sentences extracted from the WikiText-2 [34] dataset of Wikipedia articles.
5.2 DNN architecture
The same base complexity architectures are used for both the secret and the substitute model for our primary evaluation
in Sections 6.1 and 6.3. We also conduct additional experiments on image classification tasks where the model
complexities are varied between the secret and substitute models in Section 6.2.
We first describe the base complexity architectures for image and text classification:
Image classification. We use a multi-layered CNN, shown in Figure 4. The input is followed by 3 convolution blocks.
Each convolution block consists of 2 repeated units – a single repeated unit consists of 2 convolution (3 × 3 kernel
with stride 1) and 1 pooling (2× 2 kernel with stride 2) layers. Each convolution is followed by a ReLU activation and
batch normalization layer. Pooling is followed by a dropout. Convolution layers in each block use 32, 64 and 128 filters
respectively. No two layers share parameters. The output of the final pooling layer is flattened and passed through fully
connected and softmax layers to obtain the vector of output probabilities.
Text classification. We use the CNN for sentence classification by Kim [35]. In the secret model, word2vec [36] is
first used to obtain the word embeddings. The embeddings are then concatenated and 100 1-dimensional filters each
of sizes 3, 4 and 5 are applied to convolve over time. This is followed by max-over-time pooling, which produces a
300-dimensional vector. This vector is then passed through fully connected and softmax layers to obtain the vector of
output probabilities.
5.3 Training Regime
For training, we use the Adam optimizer [37] with default hyperparameters (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999,  = 10−8 and a
learning rate of 0.001). In each iteration, the network is trained starting from the same random initialization for at most
1,000 epochs with a batch size of 150 (for images) or 50 (for text). Early stopping is used with a patience of 100 epochs
(for images) or 20 epochs (for text). An L2 regularizer is applied to all the model parameters with a loss term multiplier
of 0.001, and dropout is applied at a rate of 0.1 for all datasets other than CIFAR-10. For CIFAR-10, a dropout of 0.2 is
used. At the end of each epoch, the model is evaluated and the F1 measure on the validation split is recorded. The
model with the best validation F1 measure is selected as f˜ in that iteration.
Our experiments are run on a server with a 24-core Intel Xeon Gold 6150 CPU and NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080Ti
GPUs. We use the algorithm parameters k0 = 0.1B (where B is the total query budget, as in Algorithm 1) and η = 0.2
across all our experiments. For the ensemble strategy, we set ρ = B, the total query budget.
6 Experimental results
In our experiments we seek to obtain answers to the following questions:
1. How do the various active learning algorithms compare in their performance, i.e., in terms of the agreement
between the secret model and substitute model?
6https://di.unipi.it/~gulli/AG_corpus_of_news_articles.html
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Figure 5: The improvement in agreement for image classification experiments with a total budget of 20K over 10
iterations. Since random is not run iteratively, it is indicated as a line parallel to the X-axis.
2. How does the query budget affect agreement?
3. What is the impact of using universal thief datasets over using uniform noise samples to query the secret
model?
4. What is the impact of the DNN architectures (of the secret and substitute models) on the agreement obtained?
The first three questions are answered in the context of image datasets in Section 6.1 and text datasets in Section 6.3.
The fourth question is answered in Section 6.2.
In our experiments, for all but the random strategy, training is done iteratively. As the choice of samples in random
strategy is not affected by the substitute model f˜ obtained in each iteration, we skip iterative training. We also train a
substitute model using the full thief dataset for comparison. The metric used for evaluation of the closeness between the
secret model f and the substitute model f˜ is agreement between f and f˜ , evaluated on the test split of the secret dataset.
6.1 Image classification
For each image dataset (described in Section 5.1), we run our framework across the following total query budgets: 10K,
15K, 20K, 25K and 30K (K = 1,000). For a budget of 20K, we show the agreement at the end of each iteration for every
strategy and each dataset in Figure 5.
We tabulate the agreement obtained at the end of the final iteration for each experiment in Table 3. Our observations
across these 20 experiments are as follows:
Effectiveness of active learning. The benefits of careful selection of thief dataset samples can be clearly seen: there
is no dataset for which the random strategy performs better than all of the other strategies. In particular, K-center
underperforms only once, while adversarial and adversarial+K-center underperform twice. Uncertainty underperforms
6 times, but this is in line with the findings of Ducoffe and Precioso [14].
Effectiveness of the ensemble method. The agreement of the models is improved by the ensemble strategy over the
basic adversarial strategy in 14 experiments. Of these, the ensemble strategy emerges as the winner in 13 experiments –
a clear majority. This improvement in agreement bears evidence to the increased potential of the combined strategy in
extracting information from the secret model. The other competitive method is the K-center method, which wins in 5
experiments. This is followed by the adversarial strategy which won in 2 experiments.
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Table 3: The agreement on the secret test set for image classification tasks. Each row corresponds to a subset selection
strategy, while each column corresponds to a query budget.
(a) MNIST dataset
Strategy 10K 15K 20K 25K 30K
Random 91.64 95.19 95.90 97.48 97.36
Uncertainty 94.64 97.43 96.77 97.29 97.38
K-center 95.80 95.66 96.47 97.81 97.95
Adversarial 95.75 95.59 96.84 97.74 97.80
Adv+K-cen 95.40 97.64 97.65 97.60 98.18
Using the full thief dataset (100K): 98.81
Using uniform noise samples (100K): 20.56
(b) F-MNIST dataset
Strategy 10K 15K 20K 25K 30K
Random 62.36 67.61 69.32 71.76 71.57
Uncertainty 71.18 72.19 77.39 77.88 82.63
K-center 71.37 77.03 81.21 79.46 82.90
Adversarial 67.61 69.89 80.84 80.28 81.17
Adv+K-cen 73.51 81.45 83.24 80.83 83.38
Using the full thief dataset (100K): 84.17
Using uniform noise samples (100K): 17.55
(c) CIFAR-10 dataset
Strategy 10K 15K 20K 25K 30K
Random 63.75 68.93 71.38 75.33 76.82
Uncertainty 63.36 69.45 72.99 74.22 76.75
K-center 64.20 70.95 72.97 74.71 78.26
Adversarial 62.49 68.37 71.52 77.41 77.00
Adv+K-cen 61.52 71.14 73.47 74.23 78.36
Using the full thief dataset (100K): 81.57
Using uniform noise samples (100K): 10.62
(d) GTSRB dataset
Strategy 10K 15K 20K 25K 30K
Random 67.72 77.71 79.49 82.14 83.84
Uncertainty 67.30 73.92 80.07 83.61 85.49
K-center 70.89 81.03 83.59 85.81 85.93
Adversarial 72.71 79.44 83.43 84.41 83.98
Adv+K-cen 70.79 79.55 84.29 85.41 86.71
Using the full thief dataset (100K): 91.42
Using uniform noise samples (100K): 45.53
Table 4: Agreement on the secret test set for each dataset (total budget of 10K). Here, N refers to the number of
iterations (as in Algorithm 1). Top-1 refers to the adversary having access only to the top prediction, while in Softmax,
they have access to the output probability distribution. The agreement is reported for the winning strategy in each case.
Dataset Substitute model agreement (%)
Top-1 Top-1 Softmax
N = 10 N = 20 N = 10
MNIST 95.80 96.74 98.61
F-MNIST 73.51 78.84 82.13
CIFAR-10 64.20 64.23 77.29
GTSRB 72.71 72.78 86.90
Impact of the number of iterations. Table 4 shows that with an increase in the number of iterations, there is an
improvement in agreement for the same budget. Thus, the substitute model agreement can be improved by increasing
the number of iterations (at the expense of increased training time).
Impact of access to output probability distribution. Table 4 demonstrates that access to the output probabilities of
the secret model results in an improvement in agreement. We believe that this is because the substitute model receives
a signal corresponding to every output neuron for each thief dataset sample that it is trained on. Consequently, the
substitute model learns a better approximation. However, as many MLaaS models return only the Top-K or often Top-1
prediction, we run our experiments on the more restricted setting with access to only the Top-1 prediction.
Impact of the query budget. As is evident from Table 3, there is almost always a substantial improvement in
agreement when increasing the total query budget.
Effectiveness of universal thief datasets. We see that uniform noise (as used in prior work by Tramèr et al. [11])
achieves a low agreement on all datasets. The reason for failure is as follows: in our experiments, we observe that
when the secret model is queried with uniform noise, there are many labels which are predicted extremely rarely, while
others dominate, e.g., the digit 6 dominates in MNIST and Frog dominates in CIFAR-10 (see Figure 6). In other words,
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Figure 6: The distribution of labels (frequency in %) assigned by the secret model to uniform noise input.
Table 5: The agreement on the secret test set for image classification tasks, when architectures of different complexity
are used as the secret model and substitute model. Each row corresponds to a secret model architecture, while each
column corresponds to a substitute model architecture.
(a) MNIST dataset
Substitute model
Secret model LC BC HC
Lower Complexity (LC) 98.73 98.15 97.63
Base Complexity (BC) 97.21 98.81 98.10
Higher Complexity (HC) 96.75 98.05 98.36
(b) F-MNIST dataset
Substitute model
Secret model LC BC HC
Lower Complexity (LC) 87.15 80.15 75.26
Base Complexity (BC) 81.50 84.17 79.88
Higher Complexity (HC) 79.83 73.35 84.01
(c) CIFAR-10 dataset
Substitute model
Secret model LC BC HC
Lower Complexity (LC) 78.34 76.83 74.48
Base Complexity (BC) 80.66 81.57 81.80
Higher Complexity (HC) 74.34 79.17 78.82
(d) GTSRB dataset
Substitute model
Secret model LC BC HC
Lower Complexity (LC) 95.02 92.30 86.88
Base Complexity (BC) 90.08 91.42 91.28
Higher Complexity (HC) 80.95 86.50 84.69
it is difficult for an adversary to discover images belonging to certain classes using uniform noise. This problem is
alleviated via the use of universal thief datasets like ImageNet. On an average, using the full thief dataset (100K) leads
to an improvement in agreement by 4.82× over the uniform baseline. Even with a budget of 30K, an improvement of
4.70× is retained with active learning.
6.2 Influence of substitute model architecture
To check the influence of the architecture on the substitute model, we consider the following three options:
• Lower complexity (LC) architecture: This DNN architecture has two convolution blocks, with two repeated
units each (consisting of two convolution layers, followed by a pooling layer). The convolution layers in each
block have 32 and 64 filters, respectively.
• Base complexity (BC) architecture: This architecture has three convolution blocks, with three repeated units
each (of the same configuration). The convolution layers in each block have 32, 64 and 128 filters, respectively.
This is the architecture described in Section 5.2 and used in all the other experiments.
• Higher complexity (HC) architecture: This architecture has four convolution blocks, with two repeated
units each (of the same configuration). The convolution layers in each block have 32, 64, 128 and 256 filters,
respectively.
We consider all possible combinations of the above DNN architectures applied to both the secret and substitute
models. The results of our experiments on the image classification tasks using all possible combinations of the above
architectures as the secret and substitute model are tabulated in Table 5.
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Figure 7: The improvement in agreement for text classification experiments with a total budget of 20K over 10 iterations.
Since random is not run iteratively, it is indicated as a line parallel to the X-axis.
As is obvious from the table, the agreements along the principal diagonal, i.e. corresponding to scenarios where the
secret model and substitute model architectures are identical, are in general high. These results also corroborate the
findings of [38]. We believe that the performance degradation from using a less or more complex substitute model than
the secret model results from underfitting or overfitting, respectively. A less complex model may not have the required
complexity to fit to the constructed dataset as it is generated by querying a more complex function. Conversely, a more
complex model may readily overfit to the constructed dataset, leading to poor generalization and thus a lower agreement
score.
Even though the agreements are higher in general for identical complexities, they are still reasonably high even when
there is mismatch in model complexities. Model reverse-engineering can be used to recover information the architecture
and hyperparameters of the secret model. Using this information, the adversary can then construct a substitute model
that has a similar architecture and a comparable set of hyperparameters, with the hope that the trained substitute model
will achieve a better agreement.
6.3 Text classification
In addition to the image domain we also present the results of running our framework on datasets from the text domain.
For each text dataset (described in Section 5.1), we run our framework across the following total query budgets: 10K,
15K, 20K, 25K and 30K. As it is non-trivial to modify DeepFool to work on text, we omit the strategies that make use
of it.
The results of our experiments on the text classification tasks are shown in Table 6. Like for the image classification
tasks, for a budget of 20K, we show the agreement at the end of each iteration for every strategy and each dataset in
Figure 7.
Effectiveness of active learning. As in the case of images, the use of intelligent selection of thief dataset samples
peforms better: there is no dataset for which the random strategy performs better than all of the other strategies.
In particular, K-center and uncertainty underperform only once each. Furthermore, incremental improvement over
iterations is evident in the case of text, as seen in Figure 7.
Impact of the query budget. As in the case of images we observe a similar pattern in the text results where there is
usually an improvement in agreement when increasing the total query budget.
Effectiveness of the universal thief. Once again, all 3 experiments using the thief dataset (random included) perform
significantly better than the uniform noise baseline. On an average, using the full thief dataset (89K) leads to an
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Table 6: The agreement on the secret test set for text classification tasks. Each row corresponds to a subset selection
strategy, while each column corresponds to a query budget.
(a) MR dataset
10K 15K 20K 25K 30K
Random 76.45 78.24 79.46 81.33 82.36
Uncertainty 77.19 80.39 81.24 84.15 83.49
K-center 77.12 81.24 81.96 83.95 83.96
Using the full thief dataset (89K): 86.21
Using discrete uniform noise samples (100K): 75.79
(b) IMDB dataset
10K 15K 20K 25K 30K
Random 71.67 78.79 74.70 80.71 79.23
Uncertainty 73.48 78.12 81.78 82.10 82.17
K-center 77.67 78.96 80.24 81.58 82.90
Using the full thief dataset (89K): 86.38
Using discrete uniform noise samples (100K): 53.23
(c) AG News dataset
10K 15K 20K 25K 30K
Random 74.51 80.39 82.76 83.97 84.20
Uncertainty 75.47 82.08 83.47 84.96 87.04
K-center 75.87 79.63 84.21 84.97 85.96
Using the full thief dataset (89K): 90.07
Using discrete uniform noise samples (100K): 35.50
(d) QC dataset
10K 15K 20K 25K 30K
Random 53.00 58.00 57.20 64.40 60.40
Uncertainty 58.60 65.20 64.40 65.60 69.20
K-center 56.80 65.60 68.60 67.40 71.80
Using the full thief dataset (89K): 77.80
Using discrete uniform noise samples (100K): 21.60
improvement in agreement by 2.22× over the discrete uniform baseline. Even with a budget of 30K, an improvement
of 2.11× is retained with active learning.
In summary, our experiments on the text dataset illustrate that the framework is not restricted to image classification,
but may be used with tangible benefits for other media types as well.
7 Related work
We discuss related work in three broad areas: model extraction, model reverse-engineering and active learning.
7.1 Model extraction
Attacks. Tramèr et al. [11] present the first work on model extraction, and the one that is closest to our setting of an
adversary with a limited query budget. They introduce several methods for model extraction across different classes
of models – starting with exact analytical solutions (where feasible) to gradient-based approximations (for shallow
feedforward neural networks). However, as we demonstrated in Section 6.1, their approach of using random uniform
noise as a thief dataset for DNNs fails for deeper networks.
Shi et al. [39] perform model extraction by train a deep learning substitute model to approximate the functionality of a
traditional machine learning secret model. In particular, they demonstrate their approach on naïve Bayes and SVM
secret models trained to perform text classification. They also show that the reverse is not true – models of lower
complexity, viz., naïve Bayes or SVM are unable to learn approximations of more complex deep learning models.
Sethi and Kantardzic [40] present a Seed-Explore-Exploit framework whereby an adversary attempts to fool a security
mechanism with a ML-based core, e.g., a CAPTCHA system that uses click time to determine whether the user is
benign or a bot. They use model extraction to inform the generation of adversarial examples that allows the attacker
to perturb inputs to bypass detection. To do this, they use the Seed-Explore-Exploit framework, which starts with a
benign and malicious seed, and proceeds by using the Gram-Schmidt process to generate orthonormal samples near the
mid-points of any two randomly selected seed points of opposite classes in the exploration phase. These are then used
to train a substitute model, which provides useful information in the generation of adversarial examples (during the
exploitation phase).
Chandrasekaran et al. [41] draw parallels between model extraction and active learning. They demonstrate that query
synthesis (QS) active learning can be used to steal ML models such as decision trees by generating queries de novo,
independent of the original dataset distribution. They implement two QS active learning algorithms and use them to
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extract binary classification models (d-dimensional halfspaces). In contrast to their approach, ours uses pool-based
active learning.
Shi et al. [42] make use of active learning in conjunction with problem domain data to extract a shallow feedforward
neural network for text applications, when interfacing with the secret model through APIs with strict rate limits. Shi
et al. [43] design an exploratory attack that uses a generative adversarial network (GAN) trained on a small number
of secret dataset samples, which is then able to generate informative samples to query the secret model with. In both
these works, the extracted model is then used to launch evasion attacks (i.e. finding samples which the secret model
incorrectly labels) and causative attacks (i.e. exploiting classifiers trained by user feedback by intentionally providing it
mislabeled data).
Defenses. Quiring et al. [44] show that when the secret model is a decision tree, defenses against model watermarking
can also be used as defenses for model extraction attacks. This defense is only applicable to decision trees, and does not
apply to DNNs.
Lee et al. [45] apply a perturbation to the predicted softmax probability scores to dissuade model extraction adversaries.
Of course, such a defense would still leave the secret model vulnerable to attacks that can work with only Top-1
predictions to be returned, such as ours. Of course, we speculate that it may lead to a lower agreement in our approach
if the adversary does not identify the defense ahead of time and continues to operate on the perturbed softmax outputs
directly.
Juuti et al. [38] design PRADA, a framework to detect model extraction attacks by computing the empirical distribution
of pairwise distances between samples. They demonstrate that for natural samples (i.e. benign inputs to an MLaaS API),
the distribution of pairwise distances is expected to fit a bell curve, whereas for noisy samples a peaky distribution is
observed instead. The queries made by a client can be logged and the distribution can be analyzed to detect a potential
model extraction attack. We speculate that our approach will break this defense, as the universal thief datasets that it
pulls from – while not from the same domain – are indeed otherwise natural, and we expect pairwise distances between
samples to fit a bell curve.
Hanzlik et al. [46] design MLCapsule, a guarded offline deployment of MLaaS using Intel SGX. This allows providers
of machine learning services to serve offline models with the same security guarantees that are possible for a custom
server-side deployment, while having the additional benefit that the user does not have to trust the service provider with
their input data. They demonstrate an implementation of PRADA [38] within MLCapsule as a defense against model
extraction attacks.
Xu et al. [47] obfuscate CNN models by replacing the complex CNN feature extractors with shallow, sequential
convolution blocks. Networks with 10s or 100s of layers are simulated with a shallow network with 5-7 convolution
layers. The obfuscated secret model is shown to be more resilient to both structure piracy (i.e. model reverse-
engineering) and parameter piracy, thus dissuading model extraction attackers. We speculate that our approach will
still be able to extract the model if it is given access to the obfuscated model through the same API interface.
Kesarwani et al. [48] design a model extraction monitor that logs the queries made by users of a MLaaS service. They
use two metrics – total information gain and coverage of the input feature space by the user’s queries – in order to
detect a possible model extraction attack, while minimizing computational overhead. They demonstrate their monitor
for decision tree and neural network secret models. We speculate that our approach may be detected by such a model
extraction monitor, however an informed adversary could choose to tweak the active learning subset selection strategy
to avoid detection by picking samples with lower information gain, and covering only a limited portion of the feature
space.
Applications. Papernot et al. [7] use model extraction for the generation of adversarial examples. They query a limited
subset of the training data, or hand-crafted samples that resemble it, against the secret model. The resulting labels are
then used to train a crude substitute model with a low test agreement. A white-box adversarial example generation
technique is used to generate adversarial examples, which are then used to attack the original secret model by leveraging
the transferability of adversarial examples.
7.2 Model reverse-engineering
As we show in Section 6.2, while the agreement obtained by us is respectable even when the secret model and
substitute model architectures do not match, agreement is improved when they match. Thus, it is in the best interest
of the adversary to try to obtain information about the secret model architecture – this is possible through model
reverse-engineering.
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Oh et al. [17] train a meta-model which takes as input the softmax prediction probabilities returned by the secret model
and predicts, with statistically significant confidence, secret model hyperparameters such as the number of convolution
layers, the filter size of CNNs, the activation function used, the amount of dropout, batch size, optimizer, etc. To do this,
they first randomly generate and trains networks of varying complexity and queries them to create a dataset to train the
meta-model on.
Wang and Gong [18] estimate the regularizer scale factor λ for linear regression (ridge regression and LASSO),
kernel regression (kernel ridge regression), linear classification (SVM with hinge loss, SVM with squared hinge loss,
L1-regularized logistic regression and L2-regularized logistic regression) and kernel classification algorithms (kernel
SVM with hinge loss, kernel SVM with squared hinge loss).
Duddu et al. [19] use a timing side channel for model reverse-engineering, i.e. they use the execution time of the
forward pass of the secret model, averaged across queries, to infer model architecture and hyperparameters. This
information is then used to reduce the search space by querying a pretrained regressor trained to map execution time to
hyperparameters (such as the number of layers). Further search is performed using a reinforcement learning algorithm
that predicts the best model architecture and hyperparameters in this restricted search space.
Yan et al. [20] use a similar insight that the forward pass of DNNs rely on GeMM (generalized matrix multiply) library
operations. They use information from cache side channels to reverse engineer information about DNN architectures,
such as the number of layers (for a fully connected network) and number of filters (for a CNN). However, such an attack
cannot determine the presence and configuration of parameter-free layers such as activation and pooling layers.
Hong et al. [22] present another attack using cache side channels that monitors the shared instruction cache. The
attacker periodically flushes the cache lines used by the victim secret model and measures access time to the target
instructions. This side channel information is then used to reconstruct the architecture, including parameter-free layers.
Hu et al. [21] use bus snooping techniques (passively monitoring PCIe and memory bus events). Using this information,
they first infer kernel features such as read and write data volume of memory requests. This information is then used to
reconstruct the layer topology and predict the network architecture.
7.3 Active learning
There is an existing body of work on active learning, applied traditionally to classic machine learning models such as
naïve Bayes and SVMs. We refer the reader to the survey by Settles [16] for details.
Active learning methods engineered specifically for deep neural networks include the following:
• Sener and Savarese [24] present an active learning strategy based on core-set construction. The construction
of core-sets for CNNs is approximated by solving a K-center problem. The solution is further made robust
by solving a mixed integer program that ensures the number of outliers does not exceed a threshold. They
demonstrate significant improvements, when training deep CNNs, over earlier active learning strategies (such
as uncertainty) and over a K-median baseline.
• Ducoffe and Precioso [14] present a margin-based approach to active learning. The DeepFool [6] method for
generation of adversarial examples is used to generate samples close to the decision boundary by perturbing
an input image until the class predicted by the image classification model changes. They demonstrate that their
method is competitive to that of [24] for image classification tasks on CNNs, while significantly outperforming
classical methods (such as uncertainty).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce three criteria for practical model extraction. Our primary contribution is a novel framework
that makes careful use of unlabeled public data and active learning to satisfy these criteria.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework by successfully applying it to a diverse set of datasets. Our
framework is able to extract DNNs with high test agreement and on a limited query budget, using only a fraction
(10-30%) of the data available to it.
Future work on developing this method of attack includes the development of better active learning strategies and the
exploration of other novel combinations of existing active learning strategies.
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